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1. INTRODUCTION 
Reliance on groups in social life is built on a strong assumption, namely that the array of information 
exchanged, explored and integrated in groups enhances decision quality relative to individual choices 
(Hinsz, 1990;). Similarly, other species organize and work in collectives in order to enhance their 
survival chances. For example, homing and migrating birds collectively decide on communal routes 
that maximize their chances of survival and successful arrival to their destination and swarms of bees 
and ants collectively choose new nest sites on which their survival depends (Conradt &List, 2009; 
Sasaki & Pratt, 2012; Edwards & Pratt, 2009). Social interactions unfolding in such collectives shape 
the emergence of collective choices that transcend a simple aggregation of individual preferences or 
competencies (Curseu & Schruijer, 2012; Krause, Ruxton & Krause, 2010).  
Although groups have the potential to become superior (as interacting collectives) to standalone 
individuals, this (emergent) potential is not always realized in real-life situations. Studies stemming 
from the group synergy literature illustrate not only that groups do not manage to achieve strong 
cognitive synergy (perform better than their best individual member - Laughlin, Gonzalez & Sommer, 
2003; Meslec & Curseu, 2013) but sometimes they even have difficulties to achieve weak cognitive 
synergy (they perform worse than the average individual performance in the group - Buehler, 
Messervey & Griffin, 2005; Hinsz, Tindale & Nagao, 2008). This paper investigates experimentally in 
two studies how decision rules (collaboration vs. identify-the-best) and the way in which are induced 
(direct vs. analogic) affect group synergy.  
2. STUDY 1  
The first study contrasts the collaborative rule with a heuristic rule, namely identify-the-best which is 
inspired from the ecological rationality view. The collaborative rule encourages opinion sharing and 
equal participation of all group members during deliberations. Although the collaborative rule 
increases the information processing efforts in groups, it also has shortcomings: (1) in absolute terms 
has not  yet been proved to lead to strong cognitive synergy (Curseu, Jansen & Chappin, 2013), and  
(2) it comes with costs in terms of time and cognitive resources that need to be invested in the group 
decision. Identify-the-best heuristic requires group members to identify the most capable member in 
the group and to improve his/her performance. In line with ecological rationality, we argue that a 
decision rule such as identify-the-best is particularly relevant to cognitive synergy, given that the core 
of strong synergy lies in groups outperforming its best individual member.  
Next to decision rule content we also manipulate the way in which decision rules are induced 
(direct vs. analogic). Recent experimental research only explored the effects of directly induced 
decision rules (Curseu & Schruijer, 2012; Curseu et al., 2013). Nevertheless, decision rules with the 
potential to foster strong synergy may stem from analogies made with successful groups in the 
environment. Via analogy with a successful group positioned in a similar decision situation, groups 
could construct a viable decision rule for their own group.  
Given the combination of manipulations (type of rule x way of inducement) we expect that: 1) the 
level of the group synergy in collaborative direct condition (CD) exceeds the group synergy in the 
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collaborative analogical (CA) condition, and 2) that the level of group synergy in the identify-the-best 
direct (IBD) condition exceeds the level of group synergy in the IBA condition.  
 Methods & Results Study 1 2.1
146 students performed the Winter Survival exercise (Johnson & Johnson, 1987) first individually and 
then in groups. The task was to decide about the rank-order of 12 items from lowest to highest 
importance for their survival. In line with Larson (2007), weak cognitive synergy has been computed 
by subtracting the mean of individual scores in the group from the group score and strong cognitive 
synergy has been computed by subtracting the score of the best performing member of the group from 
the group performance score. In the current study we crossed two manipulations (decision rule and 
type of inducement), each with two possible conditions. We have used a between-group design In the 
direct inducement conditions, groups have been asked to employ either the method of group 
collaboration (CD) or the decision rule of identifying the best performing group member (IBD). In the 
analogical condition groups had to follow either the method of group collaboration or identify-the-best 
but this time they were not directly induced but while showing scenarios of successful groups 
following these decision rules.  
Our results indicate that there are no significant differences between the collaborative and 
identify-the-best decision rule F (1,48)=0.09, p=0.75 for weak cognitive synergy nor for strong 
cognitive synergy F(1,48)= 0.28, p=0.59. There are also no differences between the two types of rule 
inducement, with F (1,48)=2.40, p=0.12 for weak cognitive synergy and F(1,48)=3.22, p=0.08 for strong 
cognitive synergy. 
 
                                      Figure 1                                                                                           Figure 2 
 
When looking at Figure 1 and 2 we further identify that contrary to our expectations, groups perform 
better in the analogical manipulation than in the direct manipulation, irrespective of the type of rule 
followed, for both weak and strong cognitive synergy. Interestingly, for weak cognitive synergy groups 
manage to reach absolute levels of synergy (scores are positive) only in the analogical manipulation, 
again irrespective of the type of rule followed. Our initial prediction was that groups following directly 
induced rules will outperform groups following analogical induced rules which involves an extra step 
in the process of establishing the group decision rules. One alternative explanation for this 
counterintuitive observation is that participants in the analogical conditions have more autonomy in 
defining their own decision rule, while groups with the direct rule manipulation have to follow an 
imposed decision rule. Choi and Levine (2004) indicate that groups that have a choice (high degree of 
autonomy) in defining their own working strategy are more committed to it and less prone to change it 
in a subsequent task.  
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3. STUDY 2 
In order to clarify whether this alternative explanation is supported by our unexpected observations 
in Study 1, we have designed a second study in which we contrast four conditions. The first two 
conditions (self-selection) are the baseline conditions in which groups are allowed to decide their own 
rule: (1) uninformed self – selection: no decision rule, groups are free to select any decision rule and no 
further influence is being exerted on the groups (USS) and (2) informed self-selection: groups are free 
to develop their own decision rule with the ultimate goal of becoming better than their best 
performing group member (ISS). The last two conditions are induced decision rules selected from 
Study 1: CD and IBA. The goal of the second study is therefore to compare the two induced decision 
rule situations (CD and IBA) with the two self-selected conditions (ISS and USS). If the group’s ability 
to reach cognitive synergy depends on the degree of autonomy in choosing a decision rule then the 
self-selection conditions should yield superior synergetic effects as compared to the induced decision 
rule.   
 Methods & Results Study 2 3.1
333 students had to perform the NASA task (Hall & Watson, 1970) first individually and then in 
groups (average size=4).  The NASA task consists in deciding about the rank-order of 15 items from 
lowest to highest importance for their survival. Synergy scores have been computed similarly to Study 
1. For strong cognitive synergy a significant mean difference has been identified between the USS 
(M=-2.47, SD=9.33) and IBA (M=3.05, SD=9.80), t= 6.51, p=0.02, CI [0.88; 12.13] as well as a 
significant difference between the ISS (M=-1.36, SD=8.87) and IBA, t= 7.10, p=0.03, CI [0.63; 13.56]. 
The comparison of conditions is also displayed in Figure 3 and 4. 
 
                             Figure 3                                                                                              Figure 4  
4. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our paper contributes to the decision-making stream of research by indicating the beneficial effects of 
a heuristic decision rule (imitate-the-successful/ analogical inducement) on decision quality. This type 
of inducement proves to be a stronger manipulation than the content of the rule in itself.  
Practitioners should further consider not only the decision rule used to stimulate group synergy but 
also the way in which this decision rule is being communicated and induced.  Secondly, we contribute 
to the cognitive synergy literature. Our findings indicate that strong group synergy is more likely to 
be achieved when groups (1) follow analogically induced decision rules rather than directly induced 
rules (2) follow the identify-the-best decision rule (induced analogically) rather than self-selected 
rules. This finding does have practical implications for group interventions.  
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